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THE HAZARDS OF TRAINING: 
ATTRITION AND RETENTION IN CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAMS
CIH A N  BILC.INSOY*
Apprenticeship programs in the United States, which provide workers with 
the broad-based skills required  for practicing a trade via on-the-job training, are 
sponsored either  unilaterally by employers or jointly by employers and trade 
unions. A comparison of the attrition and reten tion  rates in these programs 
shows that program completion is more likely for apprentices in joint programs 
than for similar apprentices in unilateral programs. Rates of completion are 
lower for women than for men, and lower for ethnic and racial minorities than 
for whites. Apprenticeship duration  rises with the unem ploym ent rate.
A p p re n t ic e sh ip  com bines  em p lo y m en t  
/ l a n d  t ra in in g  in  a form al fram ew ork 
w hereby  a w orker  acqu ires  b road -based  
skills r e q u i r e d  for p rac tic ing  a t rade  via on- 
the-job tra in ing . T h e  cost o f  t ra in in g  is 
sha red  by employers, who allocate resources 
to  tra in ing , a n d  app ren tices ,  who accept 
low wages d u r in g  tra in ing . Em ployers re ­
coup  th e ir  costs in  th e  la te r  stages o f  t ra in ­
ing w hen  ap p ren t ice s  b eco m e  m o re  p ro fi­
c ien t in  the  t rade ,  a n d  ap p ren t ice s  receive 
re tu rn s  to th e i r  inves tm en t over th e i r  life­
tim e o f  high-skill, high-wage work.
Academ icians, policy-makers, a n d  in d u s ­
try' w atchers have o f ten  viewed a p p re n t ic e ­
ship as an  effic ient t ra in in g  m e th o d  tha t
alleviates c red it  constra in ts  faced by new 
e n tra n ts  to th e  lab o r  force. In  o r d e r  for the 
system to be  workable , it  is necessary' for 
ap p re n t ic e s  n o t  to qu i t  t ra in in g  be fo re  
em ployers  receive a positive r e tu rn  o n  th e ir  
investm ent,  a n d  for em ployers  n o t  to t rea t  
a p p re n t ic e sh ip  as a source  o f  c h eap  labo r  
a n d  fail to deliver th e  p ro m ised  tra in ing . 
In ligh t o f  these  observations, th e  fact th a t  
less th a n  h a lf  o f  the  reg is te red  ap p ren t ice s  
in  th e  U n ited  States com p le te  tra in in g  may 
be  a cause for c o n ce rn .  If the  h igh  ra te  o f  
a t t r i t io n  is sym ptom atic  o f  unfu lf i l led  ex­
p ec ta t ions  o f  suppliers  o r  d e m a n d e rs  of  
tra ining, the  co n seq u en t  disincentives could  
result in a socially suboptim al stock o f  skilled 
labor.
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At p re se n t  th e re  is n o  in fo rm a tio n  on  
the  post- tra in ing  lab o r  m a rk e t  exp e r ien ce  
o f  ap p ren t ice s  in the  U n ited  States o r  the  
reasons fo r  n o n c o m p le t io n  o f  t ra in in g  by 
som e app ren tices .  T h e re  do  exist n a t io n ­
wide data , however, th a t  p e rm it  an  e x p lo ra ­
tion  o f  how the  charac teris tics  o f  a p p re n ­
tices and  a p p re n t ic e sh ip  p ro g ram s arc  re ­
la ted  to  the  l ike lihood  th a t  a p a r t ic ip an t  
will com ple te  the  p ro g ram . T h e  dataset, 
co llec ted  by the  B ureau  o f  A pp ren t icesh ip  
T ra in in g  o f  the  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  Labor, p ro ­
vides in fo rm a tio n  on  each  a p p re n t i c e ’s sta­
tus by the  last da te  o f  da ta  collec tion  an d ,  in 
cases o f  cance lla t ion  o r  com p le t io n ,  the  
da te  o f  the  exit. In this article, I em ploy  
survival analysis te ch n iq u es  to  estim ate  the  
im pac t  o f  individual and  tra in in g  p ro g r a m -  
level factors on  the  d u ra t io n  and  type of 
t ra in ing , co nd it iona l  on  the  exit type, fo r  a 
sam ple o f  w orkers  w ho s tarted  t ra in in g  in
1989.
A program -specif ic  exp lana to ry  variable 
o f  special in te res t  in this study is t rade  
u n io n  involvem ent in tra in ing . A u n iq u e  
fea tu re  of  U.S. reg is te red  a p p ren t ice sh ip  
p ro g ram s  is the  co-existence o f  un ila te ra l  
em p loyer-sponso red  p ro g ram s  a n d  jo in t  
u n io n -m a n a g e m e n t-s p o n so red  p rog ram s.  
In the  la t te r  p rog ram s,  t ra in in g  is o rga ­
n ized u n d e r  the  aegis o f  the  collective b a r­
ga in ing  a g re e m e n t  a n d  the  a p p re n t ic e  is 
in d e n tu re d  to  a un io n -em p lo y e r  j o in t  ap ­
p ren t ice sh ip  p ro g ram . T rad e  u n io n s  have 
an  active role in d e te rm in in g  the  c u rr icu ­
lum  a n d  re q u ire m e n ts ,  ad m it t in g  a p p re n ­
tices, locating  t ra in in g  jobs ,  assigning ap ­
p ren t ice s  to e x p e r ie n c ed  jo u rn e y  w orkers 
fo r  on-the-job  tra in ing , a n d  m o n i to r in g  
th e i r  progress . W hile the  t rade  u n io n  is 
f req u en t ly  in c lu d ed  as an  exp lan a to ry  vari­
able in regressions o f  the  inc idence  o f  tra in ­
ing, its im pac t  on  ap p re n t ic e sh ip  has a t­
t rac ted  little a t te n t io n  in the  em pirica l lit­
e ra tu re .  This article p resen ts  a ded ica ted  
com para tive  analysis o f  c o m p le t io n  and  
cance lla t ion  rates in ap p ren t ice sh ip  p ro ­
gram s o rgan ized  with a n d  w ith o u t  the  p a r ­
t ic ipa tion  of  trade  un ions.
A second  variable o f  in te res t  is the  u n e m ­
p lo y m en t  rate. T h e re  has b e e n  som e d e ­
bate  co n c e rn in g  the  re la t io n sh ip  betw een
the  level o f  eco n o m ic  activity a n d  co m p le ­
tion  a n d  cance lla t ion  rates in a p p re n t ic e ­
ship p rog ram s,  b u t  the  issue rem ains  u n r e ­
solved theore tica lly  and  empirically. I ad ­
dress this ques t ion  em pirically  by es tim at­
ing the  im pac t  o f  the  an n u a l  state u n e m ­
ploym en t ra te  on  the  c o m p le t io n  a n d  can ­
cella tion  hazards  over the  te n u re  o f  an 
ap p ren t ice .
Also ex am in ed  in this p a p e r  is the  p a r ­
tic ipa tion  o f  w o m en  an d  e th n ic / ra c ia l  mi­
norit ies , relative to m e n  a n d  whites, respec­
tively, in skilled trades  tra in in g  p ro g ram s— 
a subject o f  lively d eba te  since the  days o f  
the  Civil Rights M ovem ent a n d  the  legisla­
tive changes  associated with it.
Apprenticeship Programs 
in the Construction Industry
T h e  essence o f  the  ap p re n t ic e sh ip  sys­
tem  is th a t  the  w orker  is in d e n tu re d  to an 
em ployer  fo r  a p r e d e te rm in e d  p e r io d  o f  
time d u r in g  w hich  hc  o r  she learns  a wide 
range  o f  skills req u ired  in a trade  an d  agrees 
to work fo r  low wages. Historically, this 
a r ra n g e m e n t  has achieved efficiency in the  
acquis it ion  and  provision o f  t ra in in g  by 
e l im ina ting  liquidity  constra in ts  fo r  work­
ers, b o th  by shifting the  tra in in g  costs to 
the  firm  a n d  by giving w orkers access to 
jo b s  and  allowing th e m  to ea rn  tra in ing  
wages. Firms re c o u p  tra in in g  costs they 
in c u r  in the  la te r  years o f  a p p ren t ice sh ip  
th ro u g h  the  increased  productiv ity  o f  the  
tra inees . In the  past, w h en  such a r ra n g e ­
m en ts  have b e e n  incen tive-incom patib le ,  
the  system has re q u ire d  socially o r  legally 
en fo rceab le  m echan ism s— legally b in d in g  
in d e n tu r e  a g re e m e n ts ,  c e r t i f ic a t io n  r e ­
q u ire m e n ts  fo r  en try  in to jo b s ,  o r  sanctions 
im posed  by trade  u n io n s  on  qu it te rs  an d  by 
the  em ployer  associations on  poachers ,  for  
ex am p le— to en su re  th a t  the  firm  would  
n o t  fail to deliver the  p ro m ised  tra in ing  
an d  the  a p p re n t ic e  w ould  n o t  qu i t  befo re  
the  e n d  o f  the  in d e n tu re  pe r iod .
In the  L 'nitcd States, these  m echan ism s 
have b een  historically c i th e r  weak o r  ab­
sent, and  ap p re n t ic e sh ip  has played a m u ch  
sm aller  role in the  t ra in in g  o f  the  crafts 
lab o r  force  th a n  it has in E u ro p e a n  c o u n ­
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tries (Gospel 1994; Elbaum 1995). A very' 
high rate of apprentice desertion was the 
major reason for the decline of apprentice­
ship in the United States in the nineteenth 
century'. Apprenticeship survived on a sig­
nificant scale in the construction trades, 
which arc traditionally crafts-based and 
more heavily unionized than other occupa­
tions. In 1990, the last year for which 
cumulative figures arc available, the GAO 
estimated that there were 283,000 appren­
tices in civilian programs, about 65% of 
whom were training in the construction 
industry'. Researchers and industry watch­
ers agree that even in this industry', the 
majority of the workers, especially in the 
open-shop sector, receive training infor­
mally on an ad hoc basis.1
While less structured forms of training 
(such as helpers, task-training, cross-train­
ing, and modular training) and informal 
“catch-as-catch-can” training continue to 
be the primary' routes for entry into the 
construction trades, it is widely recognized 
that the maintenance of a core of highly 
skilled workers is critical for the industry, 
and formal training is the best method to 
train these craftspeople. The Business 
Roundtable, voicing the concerns of the 
large industrial construction owners, for 
instance, has commended union-manage- 
ment apprenticeship programs and called 
for expansion of formal training across the 
whole industry' as the means to alleviate its 
chronic skills shortage, improve the quality 
of construction, reduce cost overruns, and 
prevent schedule delays (Business 
Roundtable 1997).
‘Construction industry employment increased on 
average by about 160,000 per year between 1990 and 
2000 (Berman 2001). According to the data used in 
the present paper, during the first live years of this 
period the average number of workers entering ap­
prenticeship was not more than 40,000 per year (and 
many o f them dropped out before completing train­
ing) . Two early surveys, which used different samples 
o f trades, found that 49% (Marshall and Glover 1975) 
and 37% (Silver 1986) of union workers entered 
construction trades via apprenticeship.
Apprenticeship programs that agree to 
meet the federal standards register either 
with the Bureau of Apprenticeship Train­
ing (BAT) of the Department of Labor or 
the BAT-recognized State Apprenticeship 
Councils (SACs). These programs arc or­
ganized cither jointly by trade unions and 
employers signatory' to a collective bargain­
ing agreement in the organized sector, or 
unilaterally by employers in the open-shop 
sector.
In the organized sector of the construc­
tion industry', training provisions have his­
torically been a component of the collec­
tive bargaining agreements. The collective 
bargaining agreement specifies the role 
and responsibilities of union and manage­
ment in the administration of the appren­
ticeship program, per-labor-hour training 
fees paid by the employers, apprentice-jour- 
ney worker ratios, and apprentice wages. 
The jo int apprenticeship committee, com­
posed of representatives of unions and 
employers (in equal numbers), determines 
the requirements, curriculum, and admis­
sions, and monitors the progress of appren­
tices. The apprenticeship coordinator, who 
is a union member, carries out the day-to- 
day management of the program. This 
setup provides an institutional framework 
that distributes costs and risks of training 
among the stakeholders in training, coor­
dinates their activities, and enforces the 
training “contract.”
Apprenticeship training, in Becker's 
terms, delivers “general” skills. The key to 
the returns to contractors on investment in 
training is transformation of what arc gen­
eral skills from the perspective of an indi­
vidual firm to skills that arc specific to the 
local industry'; in effect, contractors pay not 
for the training of a specific worker, but for 
the maintenance of a steady supply of simi­
larly trained workers.2 Apprentices cov­
ered by the collective bargaining agree-
2An additional incentive lor employers is the fact 
that registered apprentices are paid below the gov­
ernment-mandated wage in federal and state projects 
subject to the prevailing wage laws.
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mcnt can make use of union gricvancc 
procedures and collcctivc bargaining rights 
in order to ensure proper job rotation and 
acquisition ofrcquisitc skills. Finally, trade 
unions have a stake in training bccausc it 
allows control over the quality of labor and 
helps protcct jurisdictional boundaries be­
tween trades.3
In the opcn-shop scctor of the construc­
tion industry, apprenticeship programs arc 
established unilaterally either by a group of 
employers or by a single employer. Mul­
tiple employer non-joint programs can be 
viewed as an attempt to crcatc a structure 
similar to that of thejoint programs whereby 
the costs and risks of employer investment 
in training arc distributed across partici­
pants. Thus, these programs may also miti­
gate undcr-invcstmcnt in training by elimi­
nating the distinction between the current 
and future employers and internalizing the 
externalities that would be enjoyed by the 
third parties. They arc usually organized 
under the leadership of a contractor asso­
ciation and financed collcctivcly by the 
participating employers. Singlc-cmploycr 
non-joint programs, on the other hand, arc 
a highly diverse set, including a great many 
programs with very few trainees (often a 
single one) and a few large programs with 
new enrollments as high as several hun­
dred.4
Apprenticeship training is highly struc­
tured. Apprentices who enroll in regis­
tered programs follow a curriculum to ac­
quire manual, mcchanical, and technical 
skills for the trade and arc certified as skilled 
journey workers only upon the succcssful 
completion of a predetermined number of 
hours of supervised on-thc-job training 
(OJT) and related theoretical instruction
3\1 ills (1972:189) argued that the frequently men­
tioned labor supply control motive is an unimportant 
factor because only a minority o f workers enter the 
trades via apprenticeship and therefore it cannot be 
an effective tool for this purpose.
4For further information on training programs, 
see Mills (1972), N or thru p and Foster (1975), 
Bourdon and Levitt (1980), and Business Roundtable 
(1990).
in the classroom (RTl). Programs in con­
struction occupations generally have 6,000 
hours of OJT and 432 hours of RTI, or
8.000 hours of OJT and 576 hours of RTI 
requirements. These arc often referred to 
as three- and four-year programs, respec­
tively, sincc an apprentice working 40 hours 
a week and 50 weeks a year would complete
2.000 hours of OJT in a year. The actual 
time to completion, however, often differs 
from these term lengths. Duration of ap­
prenticeship may lengthen due to the un­
availability of training jobs or temporary 
separation of the apprentice from training 
for any other reason. Completion of the 
program in a shorter time is also possible if 
the apprentice works overtime or rcccivcs 
OJT credit hours for prior cxpcricncc. 
Regulations also allow an apprentice with 
outstanding aptitude and practical cxpcri­
cncc to be put on a fast track at the program 
sponsor’s discretion.
Data
The data for the empirical analysis comc 
from the Apprenticeship Information Man­
agement Systems (AIMS) compiled by the 
BAT. This database, the most comprehen­
sive one on apprenticeship training in the 
United States, provides apprcnticc-lcvcl 
information on demographic characteris­
tics, occupation, industry, program type, 
apprenticeship start and exit dates, type of 
exit (completion or cancellation), and the 
apprentice’s status as of November 30,1995 
(the last date for which data arc available) 
for about 70% of all registered apprentices. 
Not all states report to the system, and the 
14 states (and Washington, D.C.) that do 
not participate fully in the BAT /AIMS data­
base arc not included in the analysis.3
For the purposes of this study, I first 
identified the Five largest occupations (mea­
sured in terms of the total number of ap­
prentices enrolled) in the construction in-
5These states are California, Connecticut, Dela­
ware, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, 
New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Virginia, Ver­
mont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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Table 1. Exit Status and Duration by Program Sponsor Type.
Description All Programs Joint Programs Non-Joint Programs
Number of apprentices 12.715 7.764 4.951
% Canceled 38.8 30.5 51.8
% Completed 47.4 58.4 30.2
% Still Active 13.8 11.1 18.0
Mean Duration (in months)
Kxit bv Cancellation 26.9 27.3 26.5
Kxit by Completion 49.1 51.1 43.0
Source: BAT/AIMS.
dustry— carpenters, electricians, pipefitters, 
plumbers, and sheetmetal workers. Sec­
ond, 1 deleted the small number of appren­
tices who were not enrolled in programs 
with 8,000 hours of OJT and 576 hours of 
RTI, which is the norm in these occupa­
tions. Finally, 1 selected apprentices en­
rolled in the calendar year 1989 in order to 
m inim ize the number of apprentices still in 
training by the last date of data recording.
After clean-up of the data and deletion 
of observations with missing values, the 
sample included 12,715 apprentices (Table 
1). The majority of the apprentices (61 %) 
were trained in joint programs. Table 1 
also presents information on the exit status 
of apprentices. According to these figures, 
39% of all apprentices graduated, 47% can­
celed, and the remainderwere still in train­
ing (right-censored).6 There are, however, 
important variations between the sponsor
'’The category of cancellation warrants some ex­
planation. The data recorded an apprentice’s exit 
status as cancellation lor a variety ol reasons, includ­
ing quitting, being laid oil. being fired lor disciplin­
ary action, injury or death, transfer to another pro­
gram. closure of the training program, or correction 
of clerical errors. Information on the cause of cancel­
lation is given for only a fraction of the apprentices, 
and these remarks are often ambiguous. Neverthe­
less. cancellations due to transfers to another pro­
gram or the closure of the training program can be 
identified from the data. Similarly, cancellations that 
occur within the first week of apprenticeship appear 
to be attributable primarily to clerical errors. These 
cases, which constitute less than 2% of all cancella­
tions. are excluded from the following analysis.
types. The percentage of completions is 
higher by a substantial margin in the joint 
programs than in the non-joint programs 
(58% versus 30%). Symmetrically, relative 
to the non-joint program apprentices, a 
smaller fraction of joint program appren­
tices canceled.7
In addition to the program sponsor type, 
the BAT/AIMS dataset provides informa­
tion on various factors that may influence 
the attrition and retention rates: the 
apprentice's age at induction, gender, eth­
n ic/ racial origin, veteran status, and OJT 
credits received at the time of entry into 
training. While the program size in terms 
of the total number of apprentices in train­
ing is not available, the number of new 
apprentices entering each program in 1989 
may be used as a proxy for this variable. 1 
expanded this set of potential explanatory 
variables by adding the state occupational 
licensing requirement and state construc­
tion industry unemployment rate. Table 2 
reports the mean values and standard de­
viations of these variables by program type 
and data sources.
Attrition and Retention Rates
The lower panel of Table 1 reports the 
mean values of the duration of canceled
' These cancellation rates are substantially higher 
than those observed in Western Kurope. Cheallaigh 
(1995) reported that 21% apprentices in the Kuro- 
pean Union countries left training without qualifica­
tion.
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All Prog)avis Joint Programs Mon-Joint Programs'-'
Apprentice o f Color (%.) 14.6 15.8 12.7
Female Apprentice (%.) 3.3 4.5 1.8
Veteran Apprentice (%.) 10.8 9.6 12.6
Age at Induction 24.8 24.6 25.3
(5.4) (5.1) (5.7)
OJT Credit 28.4 21.2 39.7
(292.8) (224.2) (375.7)
Program Size 10.1 19.3 5.8
(26.5) (38.4) (16.7)
licensed Occupation1’ (%.) 17.9 13.6 24.7
State Unemployment Ratec (%.) 12.2 12.4 11.9
(2.3) (2.3) (2.2)
Source: BAT/AIMS, except for Licensed occupation (Bianco 1993) and State unemployment rate (CPS 
Outgoing Rotation Files 1989-1995).
aThe test for equality o f means between jo in t and non-joint programs is rejected at the 1% level for each 
variable.
bWeighted by the number o f apprentices.
cThe mean of annual construction industry unemployment rates over the 1989-95 period, weighted by the 
number o f apprentices.
and completed apprenticeships. The aver­
age duration of a canceled apprenticeship 
was about 27 months. This period was 
longer among jo int program apprentices 
than among non-joint program apprentices 
only by two-thirds of a month. The mean 
length of completed apprenticeship was 49 
months. Non-joint program apprentices, 
on average, completed training eight 
months earlier than jo int program appren­
tices.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the cumulative inci­
dence (Cl) rates of cancellation and comple­
tion over time in jo int and non-joint pro­
grams. These are the cumulative probabili­
ties of exit via each competing risk.8 Before
sIn the competing risks framework, the CI rate is 
the counterpart to the ordinary exit probability, de­
lined as one minus the Kaplan-Meier (KM) product 
lim it estimator. Kach CI rate is based on an overall 
survival function estimate that combines the cancella­
tion and completion hazards. The more familiar KM 
estimator or the associated exit probability assumes a 
single cause of failure and therefore is inappropriate 
in the context of competing risks. Kor instance, in the 
presence of the completion risk, the KM estimator
considering the differences between the 
program types, however, note the unex­
pected shape of the completion plots. 
Completion of a program with an 8,000- 
hour OJT requirement takes four years 
under the assumption of continuous em­
ployment, which implies that the probabil­
ity of completion is zero during the first 
four years. However, the data include a 
substantial number of observations with 
completion durations that are shorter than 
fouryears. These observations are attribut­
able, in part, to theOJTcredithoursgranted 
to workers with previous experience in the 
trade. As observed in Table 2, while the 
number of credit hours is very low on aver­
age (less than 1 % of the requirement), for 
some workers it can be substantial and can
underestimates the instantaneous risk o f exit via can­
cellation by censoring completions (or 1-KM overes­
timates the probability o f exit via cancellation). For 
the derivation of the non-parametric CI plots o f Fig­
ures 1 and 2, as well as the regression-based estimates 
o f the CI rates discussed in the next section, see 
Kalblleisch and Prentice (1980:168-70).
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Figure 1. Cumulative Incidence of Cancellation.
Time (in days)
Source: BAT/AIMS.
appreciably reduce the completion period. 
In order to factor OJT credit hours into the 
duration, 1 converted these to days at the 
rate of eight hours per day and added them 
to the duration of the apprenticeship prior 
to the calculation of the Cl rates. Figure 2 
shows, however, that even after this adjust­
ment there remain many “early” comple­
tions. These early completions—which may 
be attributed to overtime work, advance­
ment at a faster pace due to outstanding 
aptitude, recording errors in data, or some 
combination thereof—necessitate further 
modifications in the estimation process 
presented in the next section.
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that there are 
important differences between the joint 
and non-joint programs in cancellation and 
completion rates. The cumulative prob­
ability of cancellation in non-joint programs 
is uniformly higher than that in joint pro­
grams (Figure 1). In both types of pro­
grams, it rises fastest during the second and 
third years of apprenticeship and levels off 
after the end of the fourth year, to around 
30% in the joint programs and 50% in the 
non-joint programs.
According to Figure 2, the cumulative 
probabilities of completion between the 
programs are quite close until the end of
the fourth year but diverge afterward. The 
completion probability of non-joint pro­
gram apprentices is initially higher, and 
the margin is at its widest, by as much as five 
percentage points, during the second half 
of the fourth year. Almost one-half of the 
non-joint program completions take place 
during the latter period. Relatively few 
non-joint program apprentices graduate in 
the fifth year, after which hardly any ap­
prentices complete the program. The cu­
mulative completion probability of joint 
programs surpasses what is observed in the 
non-joint programs by much higher mar­
gins after the end of the fourth year, reach­
ing a level almost twice as high by the 
eighth year.9 The largest number of joint 
program completions occurs around the 
end of the fourth year and during the fifth 
year of training.
These differences in completion and 
cancellation behavior may be attributable 
to differences in apprentice-specific char-
“The completion probability plot goes beyond the 
seven-year time hori/on ol this study because ol the 
addition ol OJT credit hours into the completion 
duration.
C O N S T R U C T I O N  I N D U S T R Y  A P P R E N T I C E S H I P  P R O G R A M S  61
Figure 2. Cumulative Incidence of Completion.
Time fin days)
Source: BAT/AIMS.
actcristics, or the distribution of program 
types across occupations or labor markets. 
Indeed, Table 2 reports statistically signifi­
cant differences between jo int and non­
jo int programs in the mean values of these 
variables. Shares of minorities and women, 
for instance, arc significantly higher in the 
jo int programs. If these groups arc also less 
likely than white men to complete training, 
then the completion differentials reported 
in Table 1 and Figure 2 will understate the 
jo int program effect. Hence, it is necessary 
to control for these variables in assessing 
the impact of program type on the comple­
tion and cancellation rates through multi­
variate analysis.
Competing Risks Estimates of 
Completion and Cancellation Hazards
In this section, 1 estimate the impact of 
program sponsorship on the completion 
and cancellation rates using the Cox pro­
portional hazard model in a competing 
risks framework. This popular model pro­
vides easily intcrpretable estimates of the 
impact of explanatory variables on the span 
of time that elapses between the entry into 
apprenticeship and the exit. Explanatory
variables arc assumed to affect an unspeci­
fied hazard function multiplicatively: esti­
mated coefficients measure the impact on 
the relative risk of exit, while the underly­
ing hazard function is left unchanged. Thus, 
the proportional impact of an explanatory- 
variable on the conditional probability of 
exit is assumed not to depend on duration.
As mentioned in the previous section, 1 
adjusted the duration of apprenticeship by 
converting the OJT credits to days and add­
ing it to the observed period. There is, 
however, an additional complication con­
cerning the measurement of the appren­
ticeship period, bccausc a certain mini­
mum period of training must go by before 
the completion hazard becomes positive. 
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980:30) sug­
gested that when it is known that the exit 
cannot occur before a specific length of 
time, this information should bc incorpo­
rated into modeling by subtracting the 
known threshold from the observed dura­
tion. The obvious candidate for this thresh­
old is four years. Assuming that the appren­
tice works continuously at the rate of eight 
hours a day, the completion hazard should 
bc zero during the first four years. This 
four-year threshold for completion hazard,
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Table 3. C o x  Reg ress i on  C o m p e t i n g  Risks Es t ima tes  o f  C o m p l e t i o n  a n d  C a n c e l l a t i o n  R a tes .1’
Ca n cella lion Completio n b
Variable p z-value P z-value
Jo in t Program -0.72* ** 19.57 0.38* ** 10.44
Woman Apprentice 0.15s1 1.92 -0.31* ** 4.62
Apprentice of Color 0.12s5** 3.08 -0.39* ** 9.47
Veteran Apprentice 0.05 1.05 -0.09* 1.89
Age at Ind uction -0.03 1.62 0.02 1.14
Age at Induction-Squared/100 0.05 1.39 -0.00 1.08
Ln (Program Size) -0.06s5** 5.27 0.08* ** 7.66
Licensed Occupation 0.11s5* 2.56 -0.06 1.23








Sonne: BAT/AIMS, except lor Licensed occupation (Bianco 1993) and State unemployment rate (CPS 
Outgoing Rotation Files 1989-1995).
“Stratified by occupation and geographic region.
bCompletion hazard is assumed to be zero during the first two years of apprenticeship.
‘Time-varying covariate.
^Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
however, is too stringent, bccausc, as men­
tioned above, early graduation is possible 
through overtime work or fast-track train­
ing. Unfortunately, no information is avail­
able on either of these factors, and there­
fore it is not dear after which period the 
completion hazard bccomcs positive. As a 
compromise between no threshold and the 
four-year threshold of completion, 1 car­
ried out the estimation under three alter­
natives: onc-ycar (365-day), two-year (730- 
day), and thrcc-ycar (1,095-day) thresh­
olds.10
Explanatory variables arc the program 
sponsor type (= 1 if joint), the apprentice's 
gender (= 1 if woman), cthnicity/racc (= 1 
if apprcnticc of color), veteran status (= 1 if 
veteran), age at induction (in quadratic 
form), program size (in logarithm), state 
occupational licensing requirement (= 1 if 
licensing is required), and the annual state
‘"Adoption of the four-vear threshold would have 
led to the deletion of 2,369 apprentices who com­
pleted training at a shorter period o f time. One-year, 
two-year, and three-year thresholds reduced observa­
tions by 43, 255, and 786, respectively.
construction scctor unemployment rate. 
Unemployment rate is a discrete time-vary­
ing covariatc measured annually over the 
duration of apprenticeship. It is measured 
in five percentage point units. Continuous 
variables (age, program size, and unem­
ployment rate) arc measured as deviations 
from their mean values. Finally, regres­
sions arc stratified by four geographic re­
gions (following the U.S. Bureau of Census 
classification) and five occupations, which 
allows baseline functions specific to cach of 
the 20 strata but restricts regression cocffi- 
cicnts to be equal across groups.
In estimations reported in Tabic 3, the 
completion threshold is set at 730 days. 
Reported estimates confirm that there arc 
statistically significant diffcrcnccs between 
the joint and non-joint programs in terms 
of the cancellation and completion rates of 
apprentices even after controls for other 
variables arc included. The cancellation 
hazard is smaller in the joint programs than 
in the non-joint programs. Symmetrically, 
the completion hazard is higher in the joint 
programs, although by a smaller margin. 
These results arc consistent with the bivari- 
atc findings reported in Tabic 2.
In order to gauge the magnitude of the
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Table 4. Percentage Point Differences between the 
Cumulative Incidence (CI) Rates of Joint and Non-joint Programs.
End of Year:
Eleii-rii'iam— Sou 111 Eleiiriiian-—North
Can i vllu lion Completion Can lellalion Completion
1 -5.6 __ -1.5 __
2 -12.7 — -8.6 —
3 -19.8 1.3 -14.8 2.2
4 -22.1 6.1 -23.0 7.8
5 -22.8 13.8 -26.5 21.9
6 -23.1 15.9 -27.1 25.7
N 980 723 1,114 383
Notes: The differential is CI (joint program) - CI (non-joint program). CI rates are calculated using estimates 
from Table 3 under the assumptions that the apprentice is white, male, and non-veteran, occupation is 
unlicensed, and all continuous variables are at their mean values.
sponsorship effect, I estimated the CI rates 
for joint and non-joint programs (assum­
ing that the apprentice is white, non-vet­
eran, and male, the occupation is unli­
censed, and all continuous variables are at 
their mean values). Full reporting of these 
estimates is unwieldy, since there are 20 
strata by region and occupation. For illus­
trative purposes, differences in CI rates 
between the joint and non-joint programs 
at yearly intervals are reported in Table 4 
for the two largest groups of apprentices— 
electricians in the South (N = 2,334) and 
the North (N = 1,594).
The First column of the table shows that 
the cumulative probability of cancellation 
in the joint programs is lower by 5.6 per­
centage points at the end of the First year 
and by 12.7 points at the end of the second 
year. The cancellation rate differentials 
increase rapidly until the end of the fourth 
year and stabilize afterward at a level ex­
ceeding 20 percentage points. Overall, the 
non-joint program apprentices are roughly 
twice as likely to cancel. In the case of 
completions, the differentials show a simi­
lar pattern, with a slight difference in tim­
ing. Initially the completion rate is higher 
in joint programs than in non-joint pro­
grams by a small margin. After the middle 
of the fourth year, the differential begins to 
widen as the joint program completion rate 
progressively exceeds the non-joint comple­
tion rate. After the beginning of the sixth
year, the completion rates even out and the 
differential stabilizes at around 16 percent­
age points for the southern and 26 percent­
age points for the northern electrician ap­
prentices.11
While these estimates demonstrate that 
there is a statistically significant difference
“ The estimate ol the completion ha/ard should 
be interpreted with caution. Under the assumption 
o f proportionality, the hazard of exit in joint pro­
grams is a constant multiple of that in non-joint 
programs. This assumption fared well in the cancel­
lation regressions. Intersecting CI curves of Figure 2 
suggest, however, that proportionality is suspect in 
the case of exit via completion. Further tests also 
rejected the hypothesis o f proportionality o f the pro­
gram effect in the completion regression. To address 
this issue, I experimented by including a joint pro­
gram-time interaction variable that permitted the 
impact o f the sponsorship dummy to change over 
time. This estimation showed that the effect o f joint 
programs on the completion rate is positive until 
about the beginning of the fifth year o f training and 
is negative thereafter. The estimated CI o f comple­
tion again is higher in  joint programs than in non­
joint programs, but the differentials were implausibly 
higher than those reported in Table 4 (by a factor 
exceeding four in the first two years), shedding doubt 
on the appropriateness o f this specification. Accord­
ing to Allison (1984), given the generality o f the 
model, the violation of the proportionality assump­
tion may not be o f great concern. Allison suggested 
that where the proportionality hypothesis is rejected, 
the estimates should be interpreted only as the aver­
age effect over the period considered.
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in exit rates between jo int and non-joint 
programs, they do not give any information 
about the proccss through which appren­
tices eventually complete or quit training. 
Furthermore, they arc compatible with com­
peting explanations. The decision to can­
cel or complete an apprenticeship can bc 
conceptualized in terms of the cost-benefit 
analysis. Cancellation, as the outcome of a 
voluntary quit decision, is predicted to take 
place when the opportunity cost of training 
on the margin exceeds expected discounted 
returns to additional training. One hy­
pothesis that is consistent with the observed 
completion and cancellation rates reported 
above is that the marginal benefit-cost dif­
ferential is higher for union apprentices 
than it is for non-union workers due to 
union rules. If union workers arc required 
to complete apprenticeship and receive 
certification in order to qualify for journey- 
level wages and benefits while open-shop 
apprentices arc less likely to bc bound by 
such rules, then the latter arc expected to 
bc more responsive to outside job offers 
that may materialize prior to the comple­
tion of training and more likely to quit.
One fact that weakens the force of this 
hypothesis is that apprenticeship is not an 
exclusive port of entry into trades for union 
workers either. A worker can get a union 
card without any apprenticeship training if 
hc or she has the necessary skills to practice 
the trade. It is also the case that a union 
apprentice can take journey-worker exams 
without completing apprenticeship.18 An
'-'One may also anticipate that the likelihood oi 
quitting will vary positively with the outside wage 
r elative to the apprenticeship wage. Accor ding to the 
U.S. national apprenticeship guidelines, the appren­
ticeship wage should start at 50%. ol the journev- 
worker wage and increase gradually over the period 
ol training, reaching 90%. by the last six months. 
Collective bargaining agreements often specify ap­
prenticeship wages that conform with the national 
guidelines, but I do not have any information show­
ing whether jo in t and non-joint programs differ in 
their degr ee of compliance with the national guide­
lines. In  any case, the opportunity cost of continuing 
training lor more advanced apprentices does not 
appear to be very largo in the United States. By way of
alternative hypothesis is that voluntary quits 
arc attributable to the apprentice's discon­
tent with the occupation or the training 
program. Incoming apprentices arc more 
likely to quit if they arc not properly in­
formed, selected, or matched with the oc­
cupation, or if they arc dissatisfied with the 
quality or quantity of skills delivered by the 
program.13 The higher cancellation rate 
could then bc the outcome of a program's 
inability to inform candidate apprentices 
about the nature of the occupation and the 
training program, to supply higher-quality 
training by access to more job sites and 
better job rotation, to pair apprentices with 
qualified journey-level workers, to arrange 
in-class instruction, or to ensure that ap­
prentices arc not exploited as cheap labor. 
Joint programs may bc better suited to per­
form these functions due to multi-employer 
collective bargaining and the trade union 
operating as an institution to collect and 
disseminate information and to look after 
the interests of apprentices.
One early study based on a survey of 190 
apprentices in Wisconsin concluded that 
cancellations in non-construction occupa­
tions arc attributable to dissatisfaction with 
the employer. In the construction trades, 
in contrast, it was found that apprentices 
quit primarily either for personal reasons 
(“changing one's mind about working in 
the apprenticeshipjob”) or to find ajob “as 
good as they would have found had they 
completed the p rogram ” (Barocci 
1972:171). There arc, however, no recent 
studies on the reasons for leaving appren­
ticeship programs. The paucity of informa­
comparison. in Germany, where the dropout r ate is 
only 15%, the final year appr entice wage is about 30%. 
of the unskilled wage (Soskice 1994:41; Cheaiiaigh 
1995). Even taking into account that the apprentice­
ship entry age in Germany is much lower (16-19 
years) than in the United States, and that many ap­
prentices in Germany live with their parents during 
tr aining, the dilfer ence is substantial.
l3This hypothesis assumes that prior to entry an 
apprentice has incomplete or imperfect information 
about the nature ol the occupation and the quality of 
the pr ogr am.
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tion on post-apprenticeship wages and ca­
reers makes it difficult to evaluate the rela­
tive usefulness of these hypotheses for ex­
plaining the observed differences between 
joint and non-joint programs in comple­
tion and cancellation rates.
Another interesting Finding concerns the 
impact of the business cycle. Farber (1967) 
hypothesized that apprentices respond to 
lower rates of unemployment by quitting 
training and taking semi-skilled jobs that 
pay higher than the apprenticeship wage, 
and he offered bivariate statistical evidence 
on the counter-cyclical behavior of comple­
tion rates. Others have been skeptical of 
this argument on the grounds that appren­
ticeship is a long-term investment decision 
unlikely to be influenced by short-term fluc­
tuations (Belitsky 1967), and that statistical 
support is insufficient (Mills 1972:224). 
Estim ates reported in Table 3 show that the 
unemployment rate has statistically signifi­
cant negative effects on the completion 
and cancellation hazards, and indicate that 
the relationship is more complex than sug­
gested by Farber. Specifically, a unit (five- 
percentage point) increase in the construc­
tion industry unemployment rate causes 
the Cl of cancellation and completion to 
decline by 5 percentage points each by the 
end of the fifth year of apprenticeship. 
Lower hazards of both outcomes imply that 
the duration of apprenticeship rises with 
the unemployment rate. The pro-cyclical 
behavior of the cancellation rate is consis­
tent with the idea that cancellations are 
voluntary quits rather than an outcome of 
layoffs. During periods of expansion and 
labor shortage, it appears that apprentices 
with adequate skills receive better outside 
job offers and leave training. The impact 
on the completion hazard, on the other 
hand, indicates that training jobs also be­
come more available during the upswing, 
helping apprentices complete the training 
requirements at a faster pace.
Table 3 also shows that, relative to men, 
women face a lower risk of completion and, 
symmetrically, a higher risk of cancellation 
(although the latter difference is only mar­
ginally statistically significant). The expe­
rience of apprentices of color is similar to
that of the women. Relative to whites, their 
risk of completion is lower and their risk of 
cancellation is higher. Both estimates are 
highly statistically significant.
Union-management cooperation ap­
pears to improve women’s and minorities’ 
odds of advancing in skilled trades as evi­
denced by the substantially higher repre­
sentation of these groups in joint programs 
than in non-joint programs. Participating 
women and minorities presumably pick up 
valuable skills even when they do not com­
plete the program. Still, to the extent that 
these groups’ high rates of attrition evince 
their inability to successfully complete train­
ing, they may spell trouble for the demo­
graphic integration of the skilled labor 
force. Observers have often noted that the 
bond between the employer and employee 
is loose in the construction industry, and 
informal networks are vital in entering the 
industry and locating jobs for workers who 
are in constant flux between jobs and con­
tractors. For women and minorities, who 
were traditionally excluded from the trades 
and who, despite gains made over the past 
three decades, may still be disadvantaged 
in participating in networks, formal train­
ing and certification as a journey worker 
may be an especially important way to es­
tablish a foothold in the industry.
Finally, a larger program size increases 
the completion risk and, in the case of joint 
programs, reduces the cancellation risk. 
The impact of program size on the attrition 
rate may be due to internal and external 
economies of scale. Larger programs may 
find it easier to organize in-class instruc­
tion, access various construction projects 
(presumably of different types and sizes), 
and find qualified journey workers to match 
with apprentices on the job, which would 
allow not only a less interrupted training 
experience but also better job rotation to 
acquaint apprentices with different aspects 
of the trade. These factors may increase 
the returns to the time spent in apprentice­
ship and make continuation of training 
more attractive.
In order to check the sensitivity of esti­
mates to the completion threshold, regres­
sions were re-estimated after changing the
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threshold to 365 and 1,095 days. These 
changes had a statistically significant im­
pact on the estimated coefficients of the 
program sponsorship variable. With the 
365-day threshold, estimated coefficients 
were lowered to (-0.84 in the cancellation 
and 0.17 in the completion regressions. In 
the case of the 1,095-day threshold, they 
rose to (-0.54 and 0.77, respectively. In 
terms of the Cl plots, across program types, 
the cumulative probability of cancellation 
increased with the threshold while the prob­
ability of completion declined. There was 
no statistically significant effect, however, 
on the differential between the program 
types, which lay slightly below the figures 
reported in Table 4, especially after the 
end of the fourth year. The magnitudes of 
the percentage point differences between 
the Cl rates of the joint and non-joint pro­
grams were virtually identical across all es­
timations. Thus, estimated rates of exit 
were sensitive to the threshold, but the 
impact of union participation in training 
programs was not.14
Conclusion
Chronically high rates of attrition in U.S. 
apprenticeship programs may indicate the 
inability of the suppliers of training to col­
lect returns on investment, or the dissatis­
faction of workers with the quality of train­
ing provided. The consequent disincen­
tives for provision or acquisition of training 
have potentially serious social costs via short­
ages of skilled labor. These shortages arc 
already widely observed and commented 
on within the construction industry'. The 
available empirical work on the subject, 
however, is thin, mixed, and dated. There 
is little systematic evidence on the relation­
ship between the attrition and retention 
rates, on the one hand, and the character­
istics of apprentices and programs, on the 
other.
This paper adds to the knowledge base 
on this issue by presenting evidence from
l4Thcsc results are available iiom  the author on 
request.
the experience of the 1989 incoming class 
of apprentices in the five largest construc­
tion trades. In addition to analyzing bivari- 
ate relationships, 1 have used the propor­
tional hazards model in a competing risks 
framework to estimate the impact of an 
array of individual, program, occupation, 
and local labor market variables on the 
completion and cancellation hazards dur­
ing the six years following the entry' into 
training. The estimations show that ap­
prentices in unilateral employer-only pro­
grams were roughly twice as likely to cancel 
out of the training program as were their 
peers in union-managementjoint program s. 
Apprentices in jo in t programs arc also 
found to have been more likely to complete 
training and receive certification. Com­
bined with the fact that more apprentices 
were enrolled in the joint programs than in 
the non-joint programs, these results sug­
gest that jo int programs made a larger con­
tribution to the maintenance of the crafts 
labor force. Second, both completion and 
cancellation hazards varied directly with 
the business cycle in the construction in­
dustry, which suggests that recessions 
lengthen the time spent in apprenticeship 
and expansions shorten it. Third, relative 
to white and male apprentices, ethnic/ra­
cial minority and female apprentices were 
more likely to cancel training and less likely 
to complete it.
The cost-bcnefit framework helps inter­
pret the observed differences in cancella­
tion and completion rates across program 
types. At any point during training, it is 
reasonable to suppose that an apprentice 
will quittrainingwhen expected discounted 
returns to continuation fall below the costs 
of training, and the higher cancellation 
rate in employer-only programs indicates 
the higher incidence of this situation in 
these programs. Yet, it is not possible to 
determine definitively with the available 
data the underlying reasons for this out­
come. The higher cancellation rate maybe 
due to the ability of the non-joint programs 
to equip apprentices with skills enabling 
them to get good job offers prior to comple­
tion, thus creating higher opportunity costs 
for continuing training. Alternatively, it
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may reflect the workers’ dissatisfaction with 
the training or occupation, and their down­
ward revision of the expected benefits of 
staying in apprenticeship. The observed 
outcome could also bean artifact of union 
rules, which require apprentices to re­
ceive certification in order to qualify for 
union wages and benefits. In view of this 
unresolved question, this paper stops
short of working out implications of the 
observed attrition and retention rate dif­
ferentials for the maintenance of an op­
timal stock of skilled labor force. Before 
drawing public policy lessons, it is neces­
sary first to collect information on work­
ers’ post-apprenticeship experience and 
to discriminate among these competing 
explanations.
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